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Summers's Primer on Fuller's Jurisprudence-A
Wholly Disinterested Assessment of the Reviews
by Professors Wueste and LeBel
Robert S. Summers t
INTRODUCTION
My introductory book, Lon L. Fuller,I appeared in the spring of
1984 and numerous reviews have followed.2 Here, I select two for
comment. The first, by Professor Daniel E. Wueste, is published in
the present issue of this journal.3 It is perceptive and thoughtful,
and more sympathetic than any of the others to Fuller's most con-
troversial thesis, namely, that law has an "internal morality." Pro-
fessor Wueste rejects my principal defense of that thesis,
reinterprets the thesis, and then goes on to defend it in another way.
Here I will briefly assess these three positions.
Of all the reviewers so far, Professor Paul E. LeBel is the least
sympathetic to Fuller's jurisprudence. At the same time, he is the
most skeptical of my treatment of Fuller. In 1985, in the well-known
and widely read annual "book review" issue of the Michigan Law
Review, Professor LeBel's review appeared under the banner head-
line Blame this Messenger: Summers on Fuller.4 Professor LeBel remarks
that there is "a good deal that is of value" 5 in my book (even a
crumb the author doth savor!), but he ultimately concludes that it is
"seriously flawed" 6  and "fundamentally unsound."' 7  He also
t McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the Law, Cornell Law
School. Two former students read an earlier draft of this Article and I wish to record my
indebtedness and my gratitude to them for their suggestions. They are Mr. Sterling
Harwood, J.D. 1984, Cornell University, and Professor Leigh B. Kelley, J.D. 1980, Cor-
nell University.
I R. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory No. 4, 1984).
2 The book reviews of which I am aware are: Blanc-Jouvan, 1984 R.I.D.C. 674
(1984); Bronaugh, 24 PHIL. BooKs 227 (1984); Dyzenhaus, 101 S. AFRICAN LJ. 770
(1985); Fridman, 63 CAN. B. REV. 265 (1985); LeBel, Blame this Messenger: Summers on
Fuller, 83 MicH. L. REV. 717 (1985); Lilcke, 9 ADEL. L. REV. 535 (1985); Norton, 19
U.B.C. L. REV. 300 (1985); Peczenik, 4 CAN. PHIL. REV. 87 (1984); Powers, 1985 DUKE
LJ. 221 (1985); Winston, 95 ETHICS 751 (1985); Wueste, Fuler's Processual Philosophy of
Law, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (1986).
3 Wueste, Fuller's Processual Philosophy of Law (Book Review), 71 CORNELL L. REV.
1205 (1986).
4 LeBel, Blame This Messenger: Summers on Fuller (Book Review), 83 MIcn. L. REV.
717 (1985).
5 Id. at 722.
6 Id. at 721.
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opines that the general editor of the series in which my book ap-
peared erred from the beginning by inviting me to write on Fuller.8
Professor LeBel also indicates that, in his view, my book compares
most unfavorably with the three others that had then appeared in
the series.9 In his closing sentence, he offers the veiled suggestion
that we would all be better off had I not written the book.' 0 (But he
does not recommend that it be burned!) Here I will identify and
discuss each of the "flaws" Professor LeBel claims to find (and to
which he devotes more than passing reference),." As we will see,
Professor LeBel does have some interest in the central issues, but
unlike Professor Wueste, he rejects Fuller's claim that law has an
"internal morality."
I
PROFESSOR WUESTE ON THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF LAW
In 1964, in his book The Morality of Law,12 Professor Fuller set
forth eight "principles of legality," as he called them. In his view,
these principles apply at least to the making and administration of
statute law (and to certain other forms of what he called "made"
law, when appropriate).' 3 Thus, at minimum, statute law:
(1) ought to be sufficiently general (that is, take the form of
principled rules);
(2) ought to be publicly promulgated;
(3) ought to be sufficiently prospective;
(4) ought to be clear and intelligible;
7 Id. at 731.
8 Id. at 721-22.
9 Id. at 718-2 1. The previous volumes were: A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER (1983); N.
MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART (1981); and W. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982).
10 LeBel, supra note 4, at 731. Here is what he says:
In his earlier text on American legal theory, Professor Summers dis-
tinguished the fox from the hedgehog, and adopted the stance of the
hedgehog which knows one great thing or which has the best trick of all.
Considering the fundamentally unsound nature of Summers' introduc-
tion of the work of Lon Fuller, I suspect that both the subject and the
readers of the Jurists series would have been better served had the
hedgehog stuck to his pragmatic instrumentalist trick.
Id. (footnote omitted).
I I I will not, however, respond to the numerous ad horninem remarks and innuendos
in Professor LeBel's review. These include suggestions that I am not a "substantial
scholar[] in [my] own right," LeBel, supra note 4, at 721, that I am a kind of "hagiogra-
pher," id. at 722, who is blindly seeking to "sustain Fuller in [an] exalted position," id. at
723, and that I merely substitute "[lI]abelling" for analysis, all in a deeply misguided
effort to "protect natural law theory from inanity," id. at 724.
12 L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 2 (1964). Fuller published a second edi-
tion, with a reply to critics, in 1969.
13 Id. Fuller's most elaborate treatment of the distinction between "made law" and
"implicit law" appears in L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 43-84 (1968).
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(5) ought to be free of contradictions;
(6) ought to be sufficiently constant through time so people
can order their behavior accordingly;
(7) ought not to require the impossible; and
(8) ought to be administered in a way sufficiently congruent
with its wording so that people can abide by it.
Fuller claimed that these more or less procedural "oughts"
constitute an "internal morality of law." (He used the adjective "in-
ternal" to mark a contrast with "external" moral principles that in-
form the substantive content of law.) I, and others, interpreted
Fuller in 1964 to mean by a "morality" that these "oughts," taken
together and as implemented, necessarily secure values of moral
worth. Fuller only hinted at various arguments that might support
his claim that the above principles constitute an internal morality.' 4
His claim became highly controversial and the many legal theorists
who rejected it included H.L.A. Hart,' 5 Ronald M. Dworkin, t6 Mar-
shall Cohen,' 7 Graham Hughes,18 Wolfgang Friedmann,19 and my-
self.2 0 Most held that Fuller's "oughts" were mere "oughts" of
efficiency, not "oughts" of morality. Several argued along the fol-
lowing lines: Concededly, a government ought to make rules, ought
to publish them, ought to apply them in a fashion congruent with
their textual formulations, and so on if that government is to be ef-
fective in realizing its substantive ends. But, although conformity to
such procedural "oughts" may be effective, it does not necessarily
yield morally good law. For one thing, the substantive ends in-
volved might be morally bad. Similarly, nonconformity with such
"oughts" does not necessarily yield anything bad. Nonconformity
might even yield something good, as when the substantive ends in-
volved are bad.
What is at stake here? Fuller believed that his internal morality
of law refutes the general positivist doctrine that there is no neces-
sary connection between law and morality.2' Fuller also viewed the
14 I canvass these arguments in R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 36-40.
15 Hart, Book Review, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1965).
16 Dworkin, The Elusive Morality of Law, 10 VILL. L. REV. 631 (1965).
17 Cohen, Law, Morality &Purpose, 10 VILL. L. REV. 640 (1965).
18 HughesJurisprudence, 1964 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 685, 693-97 (1965); Hughes, Posi-
tivists and Natural Lawyers (Book Review), 17 STAN. L. REV. 547 (1965) (reviewing L.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)).
19 See R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 37.
20 Summers, Professor Fuller on Aorality and Law, 18 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 24-27 (1965),
reprinted in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (R. Summers ed. 1971).
21 See generally Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv.
L. REV. 630, 644-648 (1958) and L. FULLER, supra note 12. The issue here is variously
defined. For explicit use of the "no necessary connection" rubric by a leading positivist,
see H.L.A. HART, TiIE CONCEPT OF LAW 202 (1961); see also R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at
27.
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internal morality of law as a source of standards for the criticism of
government through law.2 2 He assumed, too, that if its moral signif-
icance were better understood, the principles involved would be
taken more seriously, not only by persons who might criticize gov-
ernment but also by officials who make and apply law in the first
place. 23
Several years ago, when I reread Fuller prior to writing my
book on his work, I had a change of mind.24 I now believe that
Fuller's principles of legality do have a justified claim to being a mo-
rality. In the end, Professor Wueste seems to think I was right to
change my mind, though in his view, I did so for the wrong reason.
Professor LeBel simply thinks I was wrong to change my mind.
Both lament that I provided no explanation for the change. But the
explanation is simply that I became persuaded by the arguments
that I thought could be made in support of Fuller's claim, argu-
ments I summarized in my book. The argument I found most com-
pelling was this:
Fuller sought to set forth several affirmative arguments in favor of
his claim that the principles of legality somehow constitute a "mo-
rality" (i.e. necessarily translate into principles or values of moral
worth). But since he did not explicitly set forth the argument that
seems to support this characterization most fully, let me present it
here. Sufficient compliance with the principles of legality neces-
sarily guarantees, to the extent of that compliance, the realization
of a moral value, even when the content of the law involved hap-
pens to be bad. That moral value is this: the principles of gener-
ality, clarity, prospectivity, and so forth, secure that the citizen will
have a fair opportunity to obey the law. Admittedly, the choice
may be a choice to obey an evil law, but the citizen will at least
have had a fair chance to decide whether to do so or not, and to
act accordingly. This is in itself moral, even though, overall, what
the state happens to be doing to the citizen through the substance
of the law is immoral. Observe that if the principles of legality
were violated, there could be a dual moral objection: the citizen
could be subjected to an evil law and could lack any fair opportu-
nity to know of it in advance and act accordingly. Indeed, to pun-
ish or sanction a citizen for not following an evil (or even a
beneficent) law that is unfollowable is also unjust. And injustice is
22 See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 12, at ch. 2.
23 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 27-31.
24 In fact, I have even changed my mind on other occasions! In one case, I was led
to invent a wholly new form of citation: "Don't see." Thus in footnote I at page 14 of R.
SUMMERS, Notes on Criticisni in Legal Philosophy, in MORE ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOsoPItY (R.
Summers ed. 1971), the reader will find: "I once got it all badly wrong. Don't see Sum-
mers, Logic in the Lawv, 72 MIND 254 (1963)." It is a great pity that this new form of
citation has not yet caught on, for I believe most authors might find some use for it, even
Professor LeBel.
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indisputably immoral. (Fuller did point out that when his eight
requirements are not sufficiently met, the citizen can have no
meaningful basis on which to discharge any general moral obliga-
tion he might otherwise have to obey the law. This could be con-
strued as an oblique way of making the fairness and injustice
arguments I set forth in the text.)25
On two grounds, Professor Wueste rejects my foregoing fair-
ness argument in support of a necessary connection between
Fuller's principles of legality and morality. I will take up each in
turn. First, Professor Wueste focuses on Fuller's own earlier con-
cession that an occasional departure from a principle of legality
might even be morally justified. For example, this could be true of a
retroactive statute legitimizing children of invalid marriages. 26 Ac-
cording to Professor Wueste, if such a departure is justified, then
there could be no necessary connection between Fuller's principles
and morality.27 Indeed, nonconformity with such an "ought" could
actually be morally beneficent. But in an example of this kind, no
issue arises as to whether a citizen has an opportunity (let alone a
fair one) to obey such laws. Obedience is simply not the object of a
retroactive statute legitimizing children. And if obedience cannot
be an issue, my fairness argument cannot (and was not intended to)
come into play. Yet I would argue that when statute law is used,
obedience (or some form of compliance) will commonly be an offi-
cial objective, and this will give point to whether the citizen has fair
warning and an opportunity to follow that law. In such circum-
stances, official conformity to Fuller's principles (taken together)
necessarily secures, so far as law can, this form of fairness. Of
course, one may respond that legal systems could get along without
effective statute law (and all similar forms of "made" law). I deny
this, at least in the case of developed legal systems. One may also
respond that officials might choose not to visit a citizen's noncom-
pliance with an adverse consequence if that citizen lacked a fair op-
portunity to obey. But barring this, some adversity would ordinarily
follow (something Fuller assumed). Thus official adherence to
Fuller's principles of legality will at least afford the citizen some fair
warning of the adversity and an opportunity for choice in the matter
(however hard).
Second, Professor Wueste denies that having a fair opportunity
to obey is always in itself moral; he cites the example of a person
who is given a "fair opportunity" to go along with a blackmailer's
25 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 37-38 (emphasis in original, footnotes omitted).
26 L. FULLER, supra note 12, at 50-54.
27 Wueste, supra note 3, at 1209.
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scheme.28 Professor Wueste argues that the evil nature of that
scheme somehow saps this opportunity of any and all fairness it
might otherwise have. He implies that the same would be true in the
case of an evil law that is nonetheless fairly followable. 29 Thus, con-
formity to Fuller's principles of legality is not necessarily moral.
Now, one can easily imagine a person who not only blackmails, but
also departs from Fuller's principles of legality in the process. He
might, for example, give the victim directions that are unclear or
otherwise impossible to follow, so that in the end the victim is ex-
posed even though he may have tried his best to go along. Plainly,
we have a dual moral objection: not only is the substance of the
scheme of blackmail morally bad, but the victim is not even given a
fair opportunity to go along with the scheme in its entirety. So, too,
with an evil and unfollowable law. Furthermore, affording a person
fair warning and a genuine opportunity to go along with a blackmail
scheme might, in the circumstances, actually be morally better
(though not necessarily morally good overall) than if no such chance
were provided. The same may be said of a followable, as contrasted
with an unfollowable, law (even though the law in both instances is
evil) .30
28 Id. at 1209-10.
29 Id. at 1210-11. In his reply to this article, Wueste, Morality and the Legal Enter-
prise-A Reply to Professor Summers, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1252 (1986), Professor Wueste
seems to refuse to accept the terms of my variation on his blackmail example. Id at
1255-57. Yet he provides no argument that such a situation could not realistically exist.
Of course, one may imagine countless contexts where an individual is subjected to a
scheme both evil in design or result and unfair in execution which infringes upon
Fuller's moral principles.
Professor Wueste may assume that otherwise moral ends necessarily lose all their
moral value when realized to any extent through means in any degree evil. If he has
made this assumption, he should argue for its adoption, for its correctness is not beyond
doubt. On the other hand, Professor Wueste may believe that bad ends sap all goodness
from their end only when they are "bad enough," or that even where the means are very
bad, some residue of goodness may remain in their end. I incline to the latter view.
Again, either view calls for justification.
30 Most of those who have disputed with Fuller over the internal morality of law
seem to have assumed that Fuller's claim must be construed as a claim that there is a
necessary connection between his principles of legality and moral value. I see no reason
to assume that Fuller's claim can take on real significance only if so construed. In fact, a
number of the arguments at which Fuller hinted (and which I articulated in my book)
support only a strong contingent connection. Utilitarianism is analogous here. Few
moral theorists would deny that utilitarianism is a morality, yet the connection between
acting on utilitarian principles and any resulting moral value (i.e. utility) of that action is
contingent, often highly so. Utilitarianism seeks to maximize expected utility, which is
probabilistic rather than necessary. So, contrary to Professor Wueste's suggestion,
Fuller did not give his case away by admitting some exceptions.
In his reply, Professor Wueste denies that my fairness argument conforms to
Fuller's writings on the subject. Wueste, supra note 29, at 1254-55. Fuller's text on
which he relies, however, is not so inhospitable to my argument:
[I]t should be observed that my concern is not to engage in an exercise in
SUMMERS'S RESPONSE
As I read him, Professor Wueste goes on to offer a reinterpreta-
tion of Fuller's claim. He says Fuller was not claiming that there is a
necessary connection between principles of legality and morality in
the sense of critical morality (proper or true or enlightened moral-
ity), as I have so far assumed, but only in the sense of conventional
morality (socially accepted morality). Professor Wueste says that for
Fuller, moral "norms ... owe their authoritative status to accept-
ance," 3' and that for Fuller, "morality is a social phenomenon."3 2
From this it would not, however, follow that for Fuller morality
is merely a social phenomenon. Further, Fuller's theory, as Professor
Wueste reinterprets it, could not serve all of the essential purposes
Fuller seems to have intended. For one thing, Fuller wanted to re-
fute those positivists who denied a necessary connection between
law and critical morality. 33 Moreover, Fuller viewed his principles of
legality as standards of moral criticism. If, to serve this function,
Fuller's principles would also have to be generally accepted, then
they could not serve that function wherever not so accepted. Yet
much of Fuller's own criticism (in the name of these very principles)
was directed at Nazi Germany, where one could hardly say that his
principles of legality were generally accepted. 34
Although Professor Wueste's reinterpretation of Fuller's claim
thus seems to be mistaken in an important way, I will briefly remark
on the interesting and extended argument he offers in support of
that claim as reinterpreted. The claim, as Professor Wueste reinter-
prets it, is that Fuller's principles of legality and conventional (that is,
socially accepted) morality are necessarily interconnected. 35 Profes-
sor Wueste's argument to support this claim is that: (1) Fuller's
principles of legality "characterize the responsibility of legislators in
logical entailment, but to develop principles for the guidance of purpo-
sive human effort .... From the standpoint of the lawmaker .... there is
an essential difference between the precautions he must take to keep his
enactments consistent with one another and those he must take to be
sure that the requirements of the law lie within the powers of those sub-ject to them. Essential differences of this sort would be obscured by any
attempt to telescope everything under the head of "impossibility of
obedience."
L. FULLER, supra note 12, at 70 n. 29. Here, Fuller sought only to clarify; he was not
addressing the justification issue to which I address my fairness argument. Indeed, even
if Fuller were to repudiate my argument, it would not follow that my argument could not
fit the foregoing text in substance. (In such matters, one may even be more Fullerian
than Fuller.) Also, insofar as Fuller did seek to argue in support of this thesis, he at least
suggested the very fairness argument I explicitly provide. R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at
37-38.
31 Wueste, supra note 3, at 1218.
32 Id. at 1219.
33 L. FULLER, supra note 12, at ch. 2.
34 See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 21, at 644-657.
35 Wueste, supra note 3, at 1227.
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the exercise of their authority";3 6 (2) these principles are thus "ele-
ments of a role morality"; 37 (3) a role morality consists of the "sta-
ble interactional expectancies of those persons who enter into the
relation in question, for example, . . . lawmaker and citizen"; 38
hence (4) "there is a necessary connection between law and moral-
ity." 39 This argument finds some textual support in Fuller's writ-
ings.40 Indeed, it is even possible to construe the concept of "role
morality" in this argument as referring to social phenomena devoid
of critical moral values as such. What this suggests to me, however,
is only that Fuller may have been ambivalent here.
As I have indicated, to serve all of his essential purposes, I be-
lieve Fuller had to be concerned partly with the relation between his
principles of legality and morality in the sense of critical morality.
But further, one need not construe a "role morality" merely as so-
cial phenomena devoid of critical moral values. One may also con-
strue a role morality as a critical morality, depending on whether it
implicates such values. If I am right, Fuller's principles of legality
(which Professor Wueste characterizes as part of a merely conven-
tional role morality) do implicate critical moral values, including
fairness.41 Such an interpretation of Fuller was not merely on the
"tip of my tongue" 42 (as Professor Wueste puts it) when I wrote my
book on Fuller; I devoted a short paragraph to it.43 Even so, I do
not think this approach to understanding Fuller provides a better
argument for Fuller's internal morality of law than my fairness argu-
ment. Even assuming that both arguments could ultimately be con-
strued to implicate the same form of fairness, mine is simpler and
more straightforward. Further, my argument does not depend on
the social facts required to specify the roles which must figure in
Professor Wueste's defense of an internal morality of law.
II
PROFESSOR LEBEL ON THE INTERNAL MORALITY OF LAw
Professor LeBel rejects Fuller's thesis that law has an internal
morality, and thus also rejects my effort to defend that thesis. Here
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW ch. 5 (2d ed. 1969).
41 Professor Wueste's own references to reciprocity might be read to implicate a
version of the critical moral value of fairness. Wueste, supra note 3, at 1217, 1221-22,
1224.
42 Id. at 1208.
43 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 38.
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we come to what might be called the first "major flaw" that Profes-
sor LeBel claims to find in my book. He writes:
Summers identifies the citizen's 'fair opportunity to obey the law"
as the moral value that is secured by compliance with Fuller's
principles of legality.... Left unstated is the basis on which the
value[] . . . Summers identifies assume[s] the guise of [a] moral
value[].
The arbitrariness of Summers' bridging of the gap between
legal principles and moral principles is demonstrated by his con-
sideration of a criticism that was directed at Fuller's principles.
Summers cites an exchange between Fuller and Wolfgang Fried-
mann in which Fuller resists Friedmann's characterization of
Fuller's principles as "'mere conditions of efficacy.' " Yet Sum-
mers himself had earlier written [in 1965]:
A further reason for refusing to apply the halo word "moral-
ity" to the author's principles of legality is that there is an
apposite alternative: They may be viewed as "maxims of legal
efficacy" and maxims of this nature are not, as such, concep-
tually connected with morality. If a person assembles a
machine inefficiently, the result is inefficiency, not im-
morality.
If Summers' facile equation of the fairness of an opportunity to
obey the law ... with morality is sufficient to turn Fuller's princi-
ples into a morality of law, then the obvious step to have taken
would have been to state simply that inefficiency is immoral.44
Professor LeBel's position is not wholly clear. He might be
claiming that fairness is not a moral value, and therefore that Fuller's
principles of legality cannot constitute a morality even though they
secure the citizen a "fair opportunity to obey the law." Actually, it
had not occurred to me that fairness, as such, might not be a moral
value. Rather, I had assumed (along with countless other moral and
legal theorists) that fairness is paradigmatically a moral value. Alter-
natively, Professor LeBel may only be objecting to my failure to set
out a full-fledged theory of "the basis" on which I claim that fairness
is a moral value. I do not have such a theory, but a few others, in-
cluding Professor Rawls,45 have made some efforts in this direction.
I know of no one who has concluded that such a theory cannot be
constructed. In any event, the lack of a fully worked out theory
("basis") does not imply that fairness is a nonmoral value. More-
over, given the almost universal assumption that fairness is a moral
44 LeBel, supra note 4, at 723-24 (quoting Summers, supra note 20, at 129 (emphasis
in original)).
45 See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); see also J. Rawls, Legal Obligation
and the Duty of Fair Play in LAw & PHILOSOPHY 3 (S. Hook ed. 1964).
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value, Professor LeBel should offer specific arguments to the con-
trary. One might then have some notion of what calls for rebuttal.
Professor LeBel also says that if my "facile equation" of the
fairness of an opportunity to obey the law with morality is sufficient
to turn Fuller's principles into a morality of law, then the obvious
step for me to have taken would have been to state simply that ineffi-
ciency is immoral. I did not in my book equate fairness with morality.
In my view, morality is not single-valued, and is still more complex
in other ways. Furthermore, "the obvious step" would not be for
me to state simply that "inefficiency is immoral." Rather, I argue
that it is morally objectionable for officials to depart from Fuller's
principles of legality (at least where a citizen's obedience is in-
volved), for this denies the citizen a fair warning and some opportu-
nity for choice in the matter. Of course, such a departure might be
both inefficient and immoral. But it might also be immoral yet effi-
cient, given the officials' aims under the circumstances. Fuller, cit-
ing unpublished laws in Nazi Germany and retroactive laws in the
Soviet Union in the 1960s, emphasized that a regime might find it
efficient to violate the principles of legality. 46
III
PROFESSOR LEBEL ON LEGAL PosrrIvIsM AND LEGAL
VALIDITY
The deficiencies of positivistic theories of legal validity is a ma-
jor theme in Professor Fuller's writings.47 Unlike me, Professor Le-
Bel has a low estimate of Fuller's contribution on this front. (He
says it is "barren[]. ' 48) At the same time, Professor LeBel embraces
legal positivism with, if I may adopt his own word, a "gushing" en-
thusiasm. 49 Certainly these differences between his general position
and mine help explain the negative tenor of his review.
Professor LeBel says that the "most serious" and "most inex-
cusable" flaw in my book lies in my description of the major legal
theory which Fuller opposed-legal positivism.50 In my book, I did
not purport to offer a full description of legal positivism. But,
46 L. FULLER, supra note 40, at 40-41, 202-03. I do not wish to deny the possibility
that inefficiency may be immoral. Indeed, in a utilitarian theory of morality, it is immoral.
47 One can readily discern this in works as early as L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF
ITSELF (1940).
48 LeBel, supra note 4, at 731. Professor LeBel is more generous in his estimate of
Fuller's writings on legal processes but he still dismisses these as merely "tangentially
jurisprudential." Id. at 731.
49 Id. at 722. Evidence of the embrace appears throughout the review. See, e.g., id.
at 718, 730.
50 Id. at 727.
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among other things, I did make the following remarks about positiv-
istic theories of legal validity:
Many positivists envisioned a kind of two-tiered "system," in
which the lower tier consists of the ordinary binding precepts of
the system [e.g., rules of contract, tort, and property] and the up-
per tier of some accepted general criterion for identifying the
precepts of the lower tier. The general identifying criterion incor-
porates the feature or features that all and only the binding
precepts of the lower tier have in common. Or as H.L.A. Hart put
it, the accepted criterion (or a limited set of criteria) specifies
"some feature or features possession of which by a suggested rule
is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that it is a rule of the
group." In this two-tiered system, the criterion itself (or a limited
set of criteria) qualifies as part of the system because of its social
acceptance, whereas the binding rules of the lower tier, though
they also may be accepted, qualify as law by satisfying the criterion of
valid law that is already an internal part of the system. For exam-
ple, if, in Great Britain, the socially accepted general criterion is
"whatever the Queen in Parliament adopts is law," then any rule
so adopted is valid law in Great Britain.5 1
I went on to point out that several leading positivists (to whose work
Fuller was reacting) also subscribed, implicitly or explicitly, to a spe-
cial theory about the nature of the criteria (standards, tests) of valid
law. According to this theory, such standards are essentially formal
in character. That is, they are source-based and not content-ori-
ented. Source-based standards, which purport to identify all and
only the valid lower-tier precepts of the system, implicitly or explic-
itly require that the validity of a lower-tier precept be attributable to
its formal authoritative origin. In my book, I explicitly described a
"source-based" standard of validity in these terms: "If the putative
law can be traced to an authoritative lawgiver, then it is valid; if not,
it is invalid."5 2 Thus, in such a theory, the validity of a putative
lower-tier precept always turns on its source, not its content.
Here is how Professor LeBel responds:
At the heart of Summers' distortion of legal positivism is an
inexplicable failure to comprehend the meaning that positivists at-
tach to the term "validity." Summers argues that a "source-
based" test of validity fails to capture the extent to which content
is actually relevant to the validity of "a lower-tier precept".... As
evidence of this failure, Summers describes the apparent conflict
between the source-based validity and the content-based validity
of an unconscionable contract, a will that conflicts with state gov-
51 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 43. For a similar account of positivistic theories of
validity, see R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 39-45 (1978).
52 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 44.
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ernmental policy, an arbitrarily discriminatory statute.... [E]ach
of the so-called content-oriented tests of legal validity is itself de-
pendent on what a positivist would have no difficulty describing as
a source-based legally valid rule. Contracts are unenforceable be-
cause of a legal rule of unconscionability, wills violate state gov-
ernmental policy embodied in properly enacted statutes, and
statutes are set aside as discriminatory under a federal or state
constitutional provision. Summers fails to distinguish between
the validity of rules, which positivists purport to be able to deter-
mine on a source-based standard, and the validity of public and
private acts, which must of course include reference to content-
oriented standards, but to such standards as are found in or infer-
able from legally valid rules.53
Professor LeBel has misunderstood me in a rather unique and
fundamental way here. 54 I did not then deny (nor do I now deny)
that forms of law embodying "content-oriented tests of legal valid-
ity" may, in turn, for their validity be dependent on, as Professor
LeBel puts it, "what a positivist would have no difficulty describing
as a source-based legally valid rule." 55 For example, section 2-302
of the Uniform Commercial Code (on unconscionability) adopts a
content-oriented standard for the validity of contract clauses, 56 yet
section 2-302 is itself valid law because it was duly enacted by the
legislature (source).5 7
I did deny and continue to deny that in a modem legal system
such as ours the validity of forms of putative lower-tier law (includ-
ing rules of contract, tort, and property) is always or even usually
determinable solely by reference to source-based standards of valid-
ity. Often, their validity is not only a matter of their properly
originating in an authoritative source but also a matter of their satis-
fying content-oriented standards. A general theory of legal validity
53 LeBel, supra note 4, at 727-28 (citations omitted).
54 None of the other 10 reviewers, see supra note 2, and none of the several persons
who read the manuscript prior to publication so misunderstood me.
55 LeBel, supra note 4, at 728.
56 Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder
of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
U.C.C. § 2-302 (1985).
57 I do not also assert that all standards of validity must necessarily be valid solely by
virtue of satisfying a source-based test.
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must explicitly provide for this if it is to permit faithful and rich de-
scriptions of the relevant legal phenomena.58 Fuller saw this clearly
and stressed it.59 Positivists preoccupied with formal source-based
standards neglected the extent to which content is relevant to the
validity of a lower-tier precept. 60 But have such positivists really ex-
isted, or are they merely straw-men-figments of my (and Fuller's,
and also Dworkin's) imagination? Yes, they existed (and continue to
exist),61 and Professor LeBel concedes as much above when he says
that "positivists purport to be able to determine [the validity of
rules] on a source-based standard." 62 In a legal system, one finds
not a few rules.63 So much, then, for Professor LeBel's charge that I
am guilty of a basic "distortion of legal positivism" and of an "inex-
plicable failure to comprehend the meaning that positivists attach to
the term 'validity.' "64 In truth, there is no such distortion, and the
positivist "straw-man" that Professor LeBel says is my invention ex-
58 See generally Summers, Toward a Better General Theory of Legal Validity, 16 RECHT-
STHEORIE 65 (1985).
59 See, e.g., L. FULLER, supra note 47, at 88-95; Fuller, supra note 21.
60 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 42-51.
61 See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 9-33, 118-91
(H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954) (lectures 1, 5-6); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW chs. 4-6, 9
(1961); H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW & STATE 29-49, 110-62 (1945); Holmes,
The Path of The Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Professor Dworkin interprets Hart's
writings on this subject essentially as I do. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 39-45.
62 LeBel, supra note 4, at 728. Professor LeBel might be read to mean only that the
validity of all standards for determining the validity of rules is a matter of source (some-
thing itself not beyond dispute). However, in the very sentence in which this quoted
phrase appears, Professor LeBel uses the same contrast I use, namely, the contrast be-
tween source-based and content-oriented standards of validity.
63 There is a puzzle here about how to interpret Professor LeBel. Although he
admits that "positivists purport to be able to determine [the validity of rules] on a
source-based standard," LeBel, supra note 4, at 728, he says earlier that a theorist whose
"theory of legal validity is unconcerned with content" is a "positivist straw-man." See id.
at 728 n.42. Of course, the very lack of concern with content that Professor LeBel ad-
mits is essentially the positivist position that Fuller and other critics of positivism (in-
cluding myself) attack. At the very least, Professor LeBel is not clear here.
Indeed, Professor LeBel is inconsistent throughout his review. I will cite several
additional examples. First, he regularly refers to Professor Dworkin's work approvingly,
yet he takes no account of the fact that in charging Fuller and me with concocting a
positivist straw-man whose theory of the validity of lower-tier law neglects content he is,
in effect, leveling the same charge at Professor Dworkin. See R. DWORIN, supra note 51,
at 39-45. Second, Professor LeBel says that I morally overload the concept of validity,
LeBel, supra note 4, at 724, yet he suggests that the very values with which I overload
validity are not moral values. Id. at 723. Third, Professor LeBel disparagingly asks if I
must add still another value to the moral universe, id. at 725, yet he elsewhere suggests
that I must add more values if Fuller's principles are to constitute a genuine morality, id.
at 724.
64 Id. at 727. Actually, I do not believe two tiers are enough. One must at least
distinguish (1) putative law of the lower tier which might be valid by virtue of source
alone or by virtue of source and content, (2) standards of validity themselves not valid by
virtue of general acceptance and rational appeal but by virtue (at least in part) of their
derivation from an authoritative source and perhaps also their content, and (3) ultimate
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ists after all. It is regrettable (indeed, it may even be an occasion for
blame) that, in this age of far too much to read, authors of book
reviews (even extended ones) cannot be more reliable messengers.
Professor LeBel claims to find a further basic flaw in my book,
one that also falls within the general theory of legal validity. He says
I adopt an "open-ended view of law," one in which law is determina-
ble by "Gallup poll and horoscope."65 He exclaims: "If this be the
alternative to positivism, give me positivism!" 66 Of course, I do not
accept these caricatures. What is more, there is a good deal at stake
here. If I am right, traditional positivistic theories are falsified
rather dramatically in a modern legal system such as ours. At the
very least, the validity of many lower-tier common law rules of con-
tract, property, and tort is not solely a matter of looking for the an-
tecedent and authentic stamp of some official originator, and no
sharp line can be drawn between the legal and the moral in "legal"
argumentation.
I must quote somewhat at length from my book for the reader
to understand the issues here. After explaining that some leading
positivists asserted or assumed that the validity of lower-tier law (for
example, rules of contract, tort, or property) does not depend on its
"general acceptance and rational appeal," but instead depends
solely on satisfying an "upper-tier" standard of validity that is
source-based, I went on, in Fullerian spirit, to say:
Common-law precepts dealing with rules of contracts, torts, prop-
erty, and the like are vital forms of lower-tier law. Yet they owe
their status as law in large measure to general acceptance and ra-
tional appeal, rather than to conformity with a general criterion or
standard of validity entirely internal to the system (i.e., having
been laid down by priorjudges). The ingredients of the common
law are in large part notions of reason (not necessarily sound in
objective terms) growing out of the subject matter of the com-
mon-law cases that arise. And in our system, whether or not a
precedent is sufficiently good to become "settled" law and there-
fore truly law is largely a matter of the acceptability of its ingredi-
ents to subsequent judges and to the legal profession at large.
Thus common-law precepts are largely law by virtue of the accept-
ance of these ingredients in light of their rational appeal, not by
virtue of having been formally laid down by some duly authorized
state official (i.e., a judge), the positivist's usual criterion of valid-
ity here.
It may appear that these forms of implicit lower-tier law can-
standards of validity in some sense valid by virtue of general acceptance and rational
appeal.
65 Id. at 730.
66 Id.
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not be known in advance - that we must wait until a judge inter-
prets a statute, or recognizes a custom, or decides a case, before
we can know the law. This would not be the result, on the positiv-
ist's theory, for criteria of validity internal to the system are known
and usable in advance, a great virtue. But even if, on Fuller's
view, lower-tier law owes its status as law primarily to acceptance
and rational appeal, it does not follow that citizens, lawyers, and
others must usually wait for a judge's ruling to know the law.
Although this cannot be developed here, in my view, the grounds
on which interpretational notions, custom, and common law are
received are very largely generalizable, are in fact so generalized,
and are widely understood within at least the legal profession.
Thus for the law to be knowable in advance, it is simply not neces-
sary to have.., a system in which law is identifiable preferably by
reference to the antecedent and authentic stamp of some authori-
tative originator. LaW can be sufficiently identified by other
means.
6 7
Before quoting Professor LeBel's response to the foregoing
passage I should stress that the context (which he ignores) of my
remarks above shows that I am mainly seeking to rebut the familiar
argument that if a form of law owes its validity largely to general
acceptance and rational appeal, the implications of that law could
not be reasonably known in advance. Here is what Professor LeBel
says:
Summers' attempt to use the experience of the common law
as proof of the failure of the positivist quest involves him in a con-
voluted tangle of uses of the word "law" that might well be better
abandoned than sorted out. The steps in the argument ... are
essentially these: (1) Common-law rules owe their status as law to
"general acceptance and rational appeal," rather than to their
"having been laid down by prior judges;" (2) common-law rules
are "sufficiently good to become 'settled' law and therefore truly
law" when their rational appeal "to subsequent judges and to the
legal profession at large" gives them a certain level of acceptance;
(3) common-law rules have the status of law even before ajudicial
decision because (and here Summers must be quoted lest the re-
viewer be accused of intentionally parodying his views)
in my view, the grounds on which interpretational notions,
custom, and common law are received are very largely gener-
alizable, are in fact so generalized, and are widely understood
within at least the legal profession. Thus for the law to be
knowable in advance, it is simply not necessary to have the
kind of system for which so many positivists seem to have
yearned - a system in which law is identifiable preferably by
reference to the antecedent and authentic stamp of some au-
67 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 50 (footnote and citation omitted).
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thoritative originator. Law can be sufficiently identified by
other means.
Summers' argument can be tested by taking a fairly common
situation and seeing where the steps of his reasoning lead. Driver
A and driver B are in a two-car collision, in which B struck A's car
from the rear, and B wishes to sue A for damages for the personal
injuries and property damage suffered in the accident. The
supreme court of the state in which the accident occurred has con-
sistently held to a common-law rule of contributory negligence.
In recent years, nearly two-thirds of the states have replaced con-
tributory negligence with one of three different forms of compara-
tive negligence. The legislature of our hypothetical state has
considered but not enacted a comparative negligence bill in each
of its last three sessions. In such a state of affairs, it is difficult to
believe that anyone could seriously contend that "the law" in this
jurisdiction is anything other than the most recent pronounce-
ment to have received the "antecedent and authentic stamp of
some authoritative originator." If the state supreme court were to
decide tomorrow to adopt a system of comparative negligence,
would that be the law of the state because of its "general accept-
ance and rational appeal"? Would it become "good" or "settled"
law only when its rational appeal "to the legal profession at large"
has produced an (unspecified) level of acceptance? And before the
court announced the comparative negligence rule, did that rule
have the status of law because it was "knowable in advance" at
least within those segments of the legal profession which could
see it coming? 68
Professor LeBel thus attempts to reduce my position to absurd-
ity. He thinks that the "steps of [my] reasoning lead" to the absurd
conclusion that before a state's highest court actually announced a
comparative negligence doctrine, that doctrine could nevertheless
already have "the status of [valid] law because it was 'knowable in
advance' at least within those segments of the legal profession which
could see it coming," even though (1) the court had previously had
occasion to adhere to the common-law rule of contributory negli-
gence and had consistently done so and (2) the legislature had con-
sidered but not enacted a comparative negligence bill in each of its
last three sessions.
I agree with Professor LeBel that if my position entailed such a
conclusion, then it would be absurd. But such a conclusion hardly
follows from my position, and Professor LeBel fails to provide any
argument that it does. He even fails to perceive that the passage of
mine which he quotes, and on which he principally relies, is offered
68 LeBel, supra note 4, at 729-30 (quoting R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 50 (empha-
sis in original)) (footnotes omitted).
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mainly as a rebuttal to the positivistic claim that the only alternative
to determining the validity of lower-tier law in accord with a source-
based standard (the "antecedent and authentic stamp of some au-
thoritative originator" 69 ) is an alternative in which it is impossible
(or nearly so) to know in advance what the law is. Moreover, despite
my repeated use of explicit qualifying expressions (such as "in large
measure" and "in large part") he fails to note that I presuppose (in
the type of situation he envisions) that one can meaningfully cite at
least some prior judicial action (appropriately generalized as need
be) in support of recognizing the putative law in question. 70 Yet in
Professor LeBel's example, intended to reduce my argument to ab-
surdity, no such prior judicial action in the jurisdiction favors com-
parative negligence. On the contrary, Professor LeBel postulates
that the state's highest court has "consistently held to a common-
law rule of contributory negligence. '7 1
In the above quoted passages, Professor LeBel also appears to
deny Fuller's claim (and mine) that in our own common-law system
''general acceptance and rational appeal" have a significant role to
play not only in determining the validity of certain upper-tier law
(criteria of validity), as many positivists would concede, but in deter-
mining the validity of putative lower-tier law, too. Certainly he
poses what is for him a merely rhetorical question: "If the state
supreme court were to decide tomorrow to adopt a system of com-
parative negligence, would that be the law of the state because of its
'general acceptance and rational appeal' "?72 For Professor LeBel,
the answer is obviously "no." Rather, such would be the law solely
because it satisfies a positivist's source-based standard, in that it
bears the "antecedent and authentic stamp of some authoritative
originator."
Perhaps the principal issue here between Professor LeBel and
me reduces largely to an empirical question about the standards of
validity actually operative within our own common-law system. In
the particular example Professor LeBel cites, the positivist source-
based story does have special persuasive appeal, given the back-
ground, context, and recency of court action. One should note,
however, that the idea of comparative negligence was one whose
time had come, and it was accepted by virtue of its content, not its
source. More to the point, Professor LeBel appears to cite his ex-
ample in support of a general positivist position that the validity of
69 Id. at 729.
70 Nowhere in my book did I deny the general relevance of source to validity. It is
true that I emphasized the relevance of content, especially in chapter 4, because in this
respect one finds a major weakness in positivism.
71 LeBel, supra note 4, at 729.
72 Id.
19861 1247
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
lower-tier common-law rules in our system is determined by refer-
ence to source, not content. Yet in support of my position, one can
easily identify many cases in which subsequent courts deciding
whether to give effect even to a very recently announced common-law
rule have ultimately refused to do so because of immediate and rap-
idly growing concerns over the quality of its content (that is, its ra-
tional appeal and general acceptance within the judicial and legal
community). 73 Here, as I observed in my book, a threshold (per-
haps minimal) requirement of substantive goodness or rightness is
at work within our system (at least in regard to new precedent of
dubious content). In my book I characterized this as a kind of con-
tent-oriented standard of validity that draws heavily on moral
ideas74 and thus blurs the line between legal and moral argument,
much to the chagrin of positivists. 75 Relatedly, in support of my
overall position, one can refer to the question frequently put by
practicing lawyers when a somewhat doubtful (in content) common-
law case is handed down: "Is that good law?" (meaning that if it is
not, it is unlikely to become settled, and therefore, valid law).76 And
perhaps I may add that if I am wrong here about the facts of our
own system, so too are many other observers (in addition to
Fuller).77
73 The reception of the Beshada v.Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191,447
A.2d 539 (1982) opinion is a good example. The case was roundly criticized for its
content, see, e.g., Note, Products Liability-Strict Liability in Tort-State-of-the-Art Defense Inap-
plicable in Design Defect Cases, 13 SETON HALL L. REv. 625 (1983); Comment, Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to Injury, 35 RUTGERS L. REv. 982, 1008-15
(1983), and within two years the court which had decided it more or less abandoned it as
a precedent. See Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 NJ. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984); see
generally Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
77 (A.W.B. Simpson ed. 1973) (common law not so much something laid down by prior
judges as something received by subsequent judges).
74 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 35, 50.
75 There is much evidence of Professor LeBel's own positivism here. See, e.g., Le-
Bel, supra note 4, at 731 (disparaging "an amorphous and indeterminate 'morality' ").
One is reminded of the arch-positivist, John Austin, who lamented the "uncertainty,
scantiness, and imperfection of positive moral rules." J. AUSTIN, supra note 61, at 300
n.29. But once the threshold content-oriented standards of validity of the kind I identify
here are admitted into the kingdom of law, the sharp lines between law and non-law so
dear to positivists simply cannot be. There can be no sharp line between a precedent
with prima facie dubious content and one without. There can be no sharp line marking
the period in which a precedent having prima facie dubious content is being "tested" for
validity. There can be no sharp line between the legal and the moral arguments relevant
to such testing. And there can be no sharp line between a precedent that cannot yet be
regarded as settled and therefore valid law and one that can be so regarded.
76 Professors who have done little or no law practice are less likely to be conscious
of the frequency with which practicing lawyers pose the question: "Is that good law?"
Actually, Professor LeBel misunderstands the essential thrust of this question. See Le-
Bel, supra note 4, at 727 n.42.
77 For example, consider these remarks of the late Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr.:
[Cohen] says: "Law is law, whether it be good or bad, and only on the
[Vol. 71:12311248
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I will now discuss another important flaw that Professor LeBel
claims to find in my book. At one point I briefly considered, in an
exploratory spirit, the extent to which a Fullerian argument might
be made that certain legal processes besides adjudication must, in
order to qualify as such processes, embody some processual com-
mitment to moral values and moral rights.78 Fuller regularly made
just such an argument with respect to adjudicative processes-he
said that if a process is genuinely adjudicative, it necessarily to some
degree affords affected parties a fair opportunity to be heard. In my
book, I cited the example of a "right of parties potentially affected
by a proposed law to a legislative hearing in which they may try to
influence the content of the legislation, and indeed, the very princi-
ple of majority rule by which legislation is enacted."'7 9 I went on to
suggest that these notions are "parallel to the adjudicative right to a
hearing with its implications for fairness and legitimacy."80
Professor LeBel is dumbstruck by what he perceives to be ap-
palling ignorance of the law here.8 He reads me to claim that par-
ties potentially affected by a proposed law have a legal right to a
legislative hearing, and then goes on to cite case law to the effect
that no such right exists. Yet in the passages involved, in the section
of the chapter where these passages occur, and generally in the
chapter itself (which is entitled "The Morality and Immorality of
Law") I am writing of moral values and moral rights!82
admission of this platitude can a meaningful discussion of the goodness
and badness of law rest." But the platitude turns out to be at best multi-
farious, and, if I am right, full of fallacy. If the statement said simply,
"Settled law is settled law," it could perhaps be accepted as a truism. But
the truism conceals the problem of determining when asserted "law" is
settled, which inescapably involves ethical questions. A far more serious
fallacy is disclosed if we read the statement as saying: "Settled law (that
is, law which ought to be accepted as settled) is law, whether it be good or
bad." For this involves in many cases a direct contradiction in terms ....
Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARv. L. REv. 929, 936 n.21 (1951) (citation
omitted).
78 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 40-41. This raises important questions about the
possible bearing of normative criteria for the use of such terms as adjudication and legis-
lation, questions that I cannot go into here.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 41.
81 LeBel, supra note 4, at 724.
82 Indeed, the key paragraph introducing the chapter reads in full:
Fuller was also mindful that his general thesis about the value-laden
character of law naturally raises the more specific question of the rela-
tionship between law and that most important subclass of all values,
moral values. In short, do the substantive and instrumental notions of
what ought to be, which on Fuller's view necessarily figure in law, ever
also necessarily translate into moral values? This question is another
controversy-ridden staple of legal theory, and Fuller gave different an-
swers here, depending on the variety of "law" in question: precepts, the
system, processes.
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A final, important flaw in my book on Fuller, according to Pro-
fessor LeBel, is my misleading characterization of Fuller's overall
position in 20th century American legal theory as that of a "prag-
matic instrumentalist." I plead guilty to having written a book on
American instrumentalist theory published in 1982.83 Now, here is
what Professor LeBel says:
When Summers turns from his pet theory [the movement
called pragmatic instrumentalism] to the work of someone
[Fuller] who by all reasonable reckoning was outside of the move-
ment, a potential trap is set for the reader who is unaware of the
peculiar perspective from which Summers views American legal
theory. In his 1978 essay on Fuller and the pragmatic instrumen-
talists, Summers noted the desirability of accommodating Fuller's
views within that theory of law. Four years later, Summers de-
scribed Fuller as a major critic of American pragmatic instrumen-
talism. Now, in a book purporting to be about Fuller, Summers
states that "Fuller stood. . . on the side of the instrumentalists,"
but he simply "did not belong to the realist wing of the American
pragmatic instrumentalism".... The reader who is attempting to
obtain an understanding of Fuller must consider the possibility
that Fuller's views have undergone at least some distortion in or-
der to enable Summers to bring Fuller into a non-realist "wing of
American pragmatic instrumentalism. "84
I will offer but two of the many criticisms one could make of this
passage. In 1978, in a memorial tribute in the Harvard Law Review,
I characterized Fuller as a major critic of various tenets of American
instrumentalist legal theory.8 5 Thus it is misleading to say, as Pro-
fessor LeBel does, that in this tribute I noted the desirability of "ac-
commodating" Fuller's views within American instrumentalist
R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 34.
The nature of Professor LeBel's error supports my suspicion that he is not conver-
sant with very much of the corpus of Fuller's own writings. There is still other evidence
of this in Professor LeBel's review. For example, his phrasing at one point suggests that
he questions whether one may attribute to Fuller the thesis that "the positivist quest for
a general criterion by which the law could be identified and differentiated must fail."
LeBel, supra note 4, at 727 n.41 (quoting R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 42). Anyone who
has read Fuller's best book, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940), would not think of
questioning this. Professor LeBel also indicates that Fuller's writings are clear, well or-
ganized topically, and readily accessible to the general reader. LeBel, supra note 4, at
720. Again, no one at all conversant with the corpus of Fuller's jurisprudential work
would say this.
83 R. SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). Professor
LeBel also offers a mini-review of this book. Among other things, he opines that the
views I express there are "idiosyncratic," LeBel, supra note 4, at 722, and "peculiar," id.
at 726.
84 LeBel, supra note 4, at 726 (footnotes and citation omitted).
85 Summers, Professor Fuller'sjisprudence atd America "s Dominanti Philosophy of Lau, 92
HARV. L. REV. 433 (1978).
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thought. More importantly, when Professor LeBel interprets my
statement that "Fuller stood... on the side of the instrumentalists"
he (again) neglects the context. In light of that context, the reader
can readily see that in the key sentence from which Professor LeBel
quotes I am merely stressing Fuller's agreement with the anti-for-
malism in instrumentalist thought. Here is what I said, in context:
The controversy over formalism dominated American legal theory
well into the 1930's. There is no question where Fuller stood: He
was on the side of the instrumentalists. However, though he was
as much an anti-formalist as most realists, he did not belong to the
realist wing of American pragmatic instrumentalism.86
Professor LeBel reads this passage to mean that I am there catego-
rizing Fuller as a member of the "non-realist wing of American
pragmatic instrumentalism." But I simply did not say that, nor is it
fairly inferable from what I said. In the end, I am inclined to agree
with Professor LeBel that Fuller stood outside the American instru-
mentalist movement, but the matter is very much more complicated
than he is wont to make it and calls for a separate essay.
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, I now regret somewhat having chosen to treat the
review by Professor Wueste together with Professor LeBel's. Apol-
ogies to Professor Wueste are in order, and I hereby extend them. I
have also devoted rather more attention to Professor LeBel's review
than its substance alone merits. I apologize to no one for this.
Truth in jurisprudence is important in its own right. It is not the
only thing at stake, however. An author who takes the time to re-
spond publicly and in detail to a prime instance of the relatively new
and burgeoning genre of book reviewing sometimes called "trash-
ing,"87 may also contribute to the demise of that singularly unscho-
larly phenomenon.
86 R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 4.
87 For a discussion of various forms of "trashing" and a serious effort at defending
them, see Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REv. 293 (1985). For another example of a
recent book review of the trashing genre, see Freeman & Schlegel, Sex, Power and Silliness:
An Essay on Akerman's Reconstructing American Law (Book Review), 6 CARDOZO L. RE'.
847 (1985).
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